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Abstract 
This paper sets out to examine a key issue: how a latecomer, like Taiwan may develop 
its industry in a post catch-up manner. We make intensive inquiries into this issue via 
case studies on two sectors in Taiwan, namely the bicycle industry and the electric 
vehicle industry. One challenge to post catch-up is related to the situation where 
innovation model and path are at the fluid phase and where scarce opportunity for 
imitation is present. This has led us to giving special account to fuzzy front-end at the 
industrial level and how market cultivation and innovative business models come to 
play an important role in shaping the innovation path for post catch-up. For a couple 
of leading players in Taiwan’s bicycle industry, a key issue they faced was how to 
transform themselves and local setting in Taiwan to become a leader in high-end 
bicycles, in an attempt to fend off escalated international competition. In the emerging 
EV industry, the Taiwanese players try to overcome its structural weaknesses in the 
mainstream automotive industry to explore the possibility of levelling the playing 
field with the forerunners in the advanced countries. Our case studies suggest that 
technological catch-up is not necessarily a prelude to post catch-up, depending on the 
nature of new innovation trajectory and entry modes of the emerging industry. While 
the way in which a latecomer’s industry to rise in a post-catch-up manner has 
something to do with path dependence, something can be done to overcome the path 
dependence. Our analyses also lend support to the importance of product servicizing 
as a means of post catch-up, especially from the perspective of market cultivation. On 
balance, for post catch-up at an industrial level, a latecomer’s innovation system and 
its boundaries have to be shaped in line with the country’s level of technological 
accumulation, constituent firm’s strategy, the complexity of the innovation at issue, 
and the way in which the focal industry is emerging. 
Key words: Post catch-up, technological catch-up, product servicizing, market 
cultivation, business model 
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1. Introduction 
Economic catch-up at the industrial level is not just a developmental process but also 
an iron-cage of developmental path and mindset. As stereotypes, latecomers in their 
industrialization process climb the catch-up and industrial upgrading ladder by either 
taking part in the global production/innovation network or forging indigenous 
innovation, especially in the equipment or capital goods industry (Mu and Lee, 2005; 
Kim and Lee, 2008) to eventually prevail in the international market. In these ways, 
the market and developmental trajectory are generally well-explored and/or 
well-defined by the leading player in the advanced country. More recently, increasing 
attention has been paid, especially by scholars of technology management, to an issue 
whether or not a latecomer can leapfrog or outcompete its advanced counterparts by 
approaching the technological frontier (Lee and Lim, 2001; Hobday, Rush and 
Bessant, 2004; Lee, Lim and Song, 2005) or at least level the playing field with the 
existing leading player in an emerging sector (Choung, Hwang and Song, 2014). 
 
Post catch-up requires “innovation activities in which the latecomer countries 
establish new technological trajectories for innovation in a changing competitive 
environment where scarce opportunity for imitation is present.” (Choung et al., 2014). 
Some literature on technological catch-up has addressed this issue under the scenario 
of “leapfrogging”, and in conjunction with several other factors, such as technological 
regimes (Lee and Lim, 2001; Park and Lee, 2006; Wang and Tsai, 2010), the 
development of the equipment or capital goods industry (Mu and Lee,2005; Kim and 
Lee, 2008; Choung and Hwang, 2007) and indigenous industrial standards (Gao, 2014; 
Choung, Hameed and Ji, 2011; Choung and Hameed, 2012). In a word, leapfrogging 
can occur with a window of opportunity (Perez and Soete, 1987), with which firms in 
a latecomer have to effectively deal with the risk of choosing the right technology and 
that of initial market creation (Lee, 2005). Despite the risks specified, much of the 
literature tends to focus on the way in which technological capabilities in the 
leapfrogging country is shaped and transformed to become a forerunner or approach 
the technological frontier. In our opinion, if one takes the risks seriously, as a 
departure from the catch-up model, post catch-up involves a scenario where a 
latecomer with few steps behind with the advanced country strives to explore “fuzzy 
front-end” in industrial innovation (Chang, Chen and Wey, 2007; Stevens, 2014), 
hopefully in a head-to-head manner. To do so, the latecomer has to deal effectively 
with such issues as market cultivation and the articulation of developmental trajectory 
with appropriate business models for the new industrial innovation involved. In 
particular, there is increasing awareness that innovative business models are not only 
essential to an innovator’s value creation and value capture but indispensable to the 
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birth of an emerging industry (Teece, 2010; Kley, Lerch and Dalliner, 2011; Lenfle 
and Midler, 2009). These issues will become more complicated if the industrial player 
in the latecomer has stuck to the comfort zone of being part of the existing global 
production/innovation network or producing modules/products with open product 
architecture, as the typical case of the manufacturing industry in Taiwan.  
 
This paper sets out to examine a key issue: how a latecomer, like Taiwan may develop 
its industry in a post catch-up manner. We make intensive inquiries into this issue via 
case studies on two sectors in Taiwan, namely the bicycle industry and the electric 
vehicle (EV) industry. The two sectors in Taiwan differ in their developmental stage 
and come across different issues in their transition period. Special attention is given to 
issues arising in their transition period to post catch-up. In doing so, we borrow the 
idea of fuzzy front-end, which used to be discussed mainly at the project level 
(Stevens, 2014; Chang et al., 2007; Alam, 2006; Khurana and Rosenthal, 1997). 
Detailed accounts of fuzzy front-end at the industrial level draws our attention to 
several issues surrounding market cultivation and innovative business models. We 
suggest that in the process of market cultivation, different business models, either 
product-oriented or service-oriented, have to be tested by the market, distilling lessons 
for continuous improvements or refinement of the business model. Our cases studies 
indeed highlight the significance of market cultivation and product servicizing (or 
termed as the servitization of manufacturing, Vandermerwe and Rada, 1988; Quinn, 
Doorley and Paquette, 1990; Chen, Wen, Yu and Yang, 2013).  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 goes through selected literature to 
present our conceptual framework for post catch-up industrial development. The two 
industrial case studies are presented in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. In Section 5, we 
discuss a few issues in conjunction with post catch-up, based on a comparison of the 
two cases. Finally, the paper draws conclusions. 
 
2.  From Catch-up to Post Catch-up: Fuzzy Front-end and Product Servicizing 
Catch-up by latecomers has been an important subject for studies of economic 
development on industrialization and research of technology management. As 
well-documented, from the perspective of economic development, latecomers’ 
catch-up has much to do with their developmental strategy of export-orientation 
versus import substitution, incorporating into the global production/innovation 
network, via learning and absorbing an external source of knowledge and 
accumulating and generating indigenous technological capabilities (Amsden and Chu, 
2003; Chen, 2002; Ernst, 2006). In the field of technology management, technological 
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catch-up has become a focal issue and has been discussed in conjunction with several 
other factors, such as technological regimes (Lee and Lim, 2001; Park and Lee, 2006; 
Wang and Tsai, 2010), the development of the equipment or capital goods industry 
(Mu and Lee, 2005; Kim and Lee, 2008; Choung and Hwang, 2007) and indigenous 
industrial standards (Gao, 2014; Choung et al., 2011; Choung and Hameed, 2012). Of 
interest to note is a sharp contrast between South Korea and Taiwan in their path and 
way of catch-up. On the one hand, Taiwan’s achievements in catch-up has much to do 
with its ICT sector, which in turn is featured by inter-organizational platform-based 
development under a regime of modular and open architecture and active participation 
in the global production/innovation network (Chen, Wen and Chen, 2013). On the 
other hand, for South Korea, not only have its branded chaebols gained international 
outreach but also the country has become a strong player in a few sectors 
characterized by closed product architecture and complex system (Kim and Lee, 2007; 
Choung and Hwang, 2007). Even in the semiconductor industry, in which both 
countries have surged, institutional roots and technological regime can still account 
for their different paths, as evident in their US patents (Park and Lee, 2006; Wang and 
Tsai, 2010). 
 
More recently, increasing attention has been paid, especially by scholars of 
technology management, to an issue whether or not a latecomer can leapfrog or 
outcompete its advanced counterparts by approaching the technological frontier (Lee 
and Lim, 2001; Hobday, Rush and Bessant, 2004; Lee, Lim and Song, 2005) or at 
least level the playing field with the existing leading player in an emerging sector 
(Choung et al., 2014). Hwang and Choung (2013) go further to initiate discussions on 
the possibility and framework condition for post catch-up by a latecomer. Compared 
to the stereotype catch-up situation where the market and developmental trajectory are 
generally well-explored and/or well-defined by the leading player in the advanced 
country, post catch-up requires “innovation activities in which the latecomer countries 
establish new technological trajectories for innovation in a changing competitive 
environment where scarce opportunity for imitation is present” (Choung et al., 2014). 
 
Long ago, Perez and Soete (1987) proposed a leapfrogging scenario where emerging 
technological paradigms serve as a window of opportunity for catching-up countries 
that are not locked into the old technological system to grab the new opportunity to 
surge in the emerging industries (see also Amsden and Chu, 2003; Lee, 2005; Lee et 
al., 2005). Lee (2005) has identified two risks associated with leapfrogging, namely 
the risk of choosing right technology and the risk of initial market creation. However, 
post catch-up can take place at different levels. For example, Hwang and Choung 
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(2013) classify post catch-up innovation activities into four levels, including: (1) new 
knowledge and value: not only creating new artefact and knowledge but also creating 
new value through new combination of existing technologies; (2) new organization of 
the production system: major changes of existing technologies/production by 
introducing brand new organization methods; (3) architecture innovation: activities 
which pursue the innovation of an end product by innovating key components or 
combining existing unit technologies based on the existing dominant design; and (4) 
social innovation: those creating a new trajectory based on unique regional demands 
or traditional industry of latecomer countries. Referring to this classification, one can 
argue that post catch-up should be interpreted and examined from more than just 
technological perspective. Instead, a broader context of innovation is needed, 
especially if post catch-up is not to become a remote possibility for most of the 
latecomers.  
 
A key issue of the paper is how may a latecomer like Taiwan to develop and/or 
transform its industry in a post catch-up manner. The Taiwanese case is interesting in 
its own right, given the fact that Taiwan’s industrial innovation is associated mainly 
with the technological regime of modular and open architecture and active 
participation in the global production/innovation network (Chen et al., 2013b), while 
most of technological catch-up cases tend to focus on the capital goods industry, 
complex systems and industrial standards, where South Korea and China are 
particularly active. In the following discussions, the authors would like to propose a 
conceptual framework for post catch-up industrial development (see Figure 1), by 
borrowing a few existing concepts as our building blocks. 
 
The first idea we draw from the literature concerns fuzzy front-end. Fuzzy front-end 
as a research concept and topic has been studied mainly at the project level (For 
example, Stevens, 2013; Chang et al., 2007), referring to the so-called pre-phase zero 
(preliminary opportunity identification, market and technology analysis), phase zero 
(product and concept definition) and phase one (product definition and planning) of 
the R&D process for new product development (Khurana and Rosenthal, 1997). At 
these specific stages, high fuzziness is related to the technical, market and 
management aspects (Nelson and Kahn, 2003), including customer preference, 
environment, competitors’ actions and reactions, technological solutions, and 
management support for new ideas (Stevens, 2013). In addition, there are at least 
three types of fuzziness, including uncertainty, equivocality and complexity. In 
particular, equivocality occurs when managers are unable to interpret or make sense 
of events, facts, and data or put an inappropriate interpretation frame around specific 
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situations. Complexity refers to a situation when a large number of parts interact in a 
non-simple way (Zack, 2001; Stevens, 2013; Chang et al., 2007). Much of the 
literature has addressed the way to manage (Chang et al., 2007) or remove (Alam, 
2006) the fuzziness from fuzzy front-end, for example through customer interactions.  
 
It is worthwhile to discuss the term complexity. The complexity of fuzzy front-end 
may be illustrated by referring to a dichotomy of autonomous innovation versus 
systemic innovations (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996). Compared to autonomous 
innovation, which can be pursued independent from other innovation, systemic 
innovations by nature require “interrelated changes in product design, supplier 
management, information technology, and so on”. While Chesbrough and Teece (1996) 
tend to suggest that systemic innovations are better managed in a hierarchical fashion, 
some authors emphasize the importance of open innovation (Maula, Keil and 
Salmenkaita, 2006) and coordination of the business network across different spheres 
(Vesa, 2006; Chen, Wen and Yang, 2014) in generating systemic innovations. In 
addition, the distinction between systemic innovations and autonomous innovation 
applies to not just manufacturing but also services (Vesa, 2006). In Spohrer and 
Maglio’s (2008) words, one challenge to this type of service innovations is “the 
interdisciplinary nature of service, integrating technology, business, social and client 
(demand) innovations”. Therefore, systemic service innovations often involve 
multi-stakeholders, playing different roles (Chen et al., 2014). 
 
For us, fuzzy front-end may also make sense at the industrial level. Utterback and 
Abernathy (1975) divided the cycle of product and process innovation into “fluid 
phase”, transition phase” and “specific phase”. The fluid phase occurs from the 
development of a new product to the emergence of a dominant design. By nature, the 
early stage of an emerging industry is a fluid phase in innovation terms, bearing a 
resemblance to fuzzy front-end. However, one should not just take a linear view 
towards the cycle of product and process innovation. For one thing, a new “S Curve” 
or innovation trajectory can surge or be created in the existing product life cycle 
(Kash and Rycroft, 2002). For another, Christensen (2003) has drawn our attention to 
an issue that outstanding and leading companies can still lose their market dominance 
because of new market trajectory and disruptive technologies. While disruptive 
technologies may be considered as “innovations that result in wore product 
performance, at least in the near term, but are generally cheaper, simpler, smaller, and 
frequently, more convenient to use”. Christensen (2003) goes further to explore the 
Bottom of the Pyramid innovation (Prahalad, 2005) in the context of disruptive 
technologies versus sustaining technologies, suggesting that innovations based on 
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disruptive technologies could be the appropriate means and playing field for new 
entrants to serve and expand the lower tiers of the market overlook by the incumbents, 
giving rise to a post catch-up scenario.  
 
In addition, to effectively deal with the fuzzy front-end at the early phase of industrial 
development requires the formation of meaningful and innovative business models to 
be tested by the market, some of which may eventually prevail at the industrial 
take-off and later stages. In fact, “the right business model is rarely apparent early on 
in emerging industries” (Teece, 2010: 187) and will eventually prevail with an 
experimentation and evolutionary process (Bohnsack, Pinkse and Kolk, 2014). A 
problem is that the literature on technological catch-up and post catch-up tends to 
overwhelmingly focus on the product-oriented business model, paying scant attention 
to the service-oriented business model. In fact, a few studies have pointed out that for 
EVs to gain a viable market foothold, against the dominance of conventional cars, 
there is a need to move from product-based to service-based business models 
(Ceschin and Vezzoli, 2010; Bohnsack et al., 2014; Kley et al., 2011). 
 
Actually, in the manufacturing sector, physical goods are increasingly associated with 
complex services that may enhance the product value for customers and provide 
commercially viable business models for manufacturers (Vandermerwe and Rada, 
1988; Brax, 2005; Chase and Erikson, 1989; Quinn et al., 1990; Lenfle and Midler, 
2009). There is indeed a substantial body of literature on such terms as the 
servitization of manufacturing, product servicizing, product service system, integrated 
solutions to highlight the trend towards blurred boundaries between manufacturing 
and services (for a review of the literature, see Chen et al., 2013a). Some leading 
companies such as IBM, GE, and Apple have pioneered different models for the 
servitization of manufacturing with success (Wise and Baumgartner, 1999), but it 
should be noted that transformation towards the servitization of manufacturing is far 
more complicated than the traditional product and process innovations, and involves 
systemic innovations in the intra- and inter-firm context. In essence, the servitization 
of manufacturing may involve issues such as strategic realignment at the corporate 
level, the rearrangement of intra-firm and inter-firm organizations and institutional 
relationships, capability-building, and new pricing and revenue models (Chen et al., 
2013a). In other words, for most of the manufacturers, the march towards the 
servitization of manufacturing amounts to a substantial departure from the transaction 
and offering of tangible goods alone. They may find themselves stepping into an 
unfamiliar territory, full of uncertainty (Brax, 2005), let alone substantial gaps in 
capabilities, institutions, networking, even in innovation governance, to be filled. 
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Moreover, there are two facets of the servitization of manufacturing and/or product 
servicizing. One is corporate strategy of transformation for individual manufacturers, 
which is widely received, and the other is related to the nature and way of 
manufacturing development, such as total solution and customer-oriented offering, for 
a few emerging sectors. For example, while LED manufactures in East Asia (Taiwan 
and China in particular) tend to adopt a cost-down and product-centric approach to 
promote LED products/modules in the marketplace by accelerating the technological 
dynamism, Dutch Philips has been devoted to an integrated energy management 
services, based on available LED products/modules. At the turn towards third 
generation mobile communications, Apple pioneered app services (known as the App 
Economy), which have not only boosted the popularity and proliferation of 
smartphones but also demonstrated the significance of applications and user 
experiences to mobile communications. Apple follows other players’ (for example, 
Nokia’s 3G) industrial standards at the architecture level, but the company’s success 
in iPod, iPhone and iPad lies in its proprietary platforms, iTunes and App Store, and 
providing software design kits for numerous external developers to design 
applications with customer experiences. This implies that the mobile communications 
sector, in terms of both service and device, has become more application- and 
service-driven than ever. In a same vein, a few studies (Bohnsack et al., 2014; Kley et 
al., 2011) have highlighted the significance of product-service system configurations 
in the emerging business model for EVs, especially for entrepreneurial car makers. 
 
Post catch-up also requires an appropriate framework condition in place. Referring to 
the case of South Korea, Hwang and Choung (2013) have outlined changes in the 
innovation system required to support latecomers’ post catch-up activities. They 
suggest “a post-catch-up innovation system in the transition of a latecomer country to 
a more advanced economy must encompass the socio-economic system that surround 
the country’s techno-economic activities” (Choung and Hwang, 2014: 158) in order to 
facilitate the creation of new technological knowledge and economic value. An 
interesting question for us concerns the extent to which the new innovation system 
required is confined by the national boundary, especially when one takes into account 
the effect of lock-in and path-dependence. As a tentative hypothesis to be explored in 
this paper, the answer for this depends on a few issues such as an individual country’s 
level of technological accumulation, organizational capabilities, focal firm’s strategy, 
the way in which the industry at issue is emerging, and how complex the innovation is 






Finally, iterations of the initial conditions and the innovation system and agenda will 
bring out, apart from industrial development in the latecomer, an outcome of new 
technological regime, under which industrial players from both the latecomer and 
advanced countries will engage with each other in a new way. Technological regime is 
a well-established term in the field of technology management, which defines the 
nature of technology and explains the specific way in which innovative activities of a 
technological sector are organized (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Malerba, 2002).  
 
In essence, our concept framework provides an integrated view on the key issues to be 
addressed in a latecomer’s transition to post catch-up. We incorporate fuzzy front-end, 
business model for industrial development and market cultivation as our building 
blocks, which have been largely ignored in the literature of technological catch-up and 
leapfrogging. In addition, special attention is drawn to the importance of the 
service-oriented business model, specifically the servitization of manufacturing and 
product servicizing, instead of just product-oriented business model. In the next 
section, we shall present two cases in Taiwan’s transportation equipment sector, the 
bicycle industry and EV in the automotive industry, to elaborate on our conceptual 
framework. 
 
3. The Bicycle Industry: A-Team and Industrial Transformation with Market 
Cultivation 
Over the last one and half a decades, the bicycle industry in Taiwan has gone through 
a period of dramatic transition. At the turn of this century, the industry was on the 
verge of falling apart, but nowadays Taiwan has become an international hub of 
high-end bicycles, in terms of not just production and exports but experience 
economy of cycling. Specifically speaking, Taiwan’s export of bicycles plummeted 
substantially from its all-time peak of about 10 million units in 1991 to 5 million units 
in 2003, with year 2000 alone registering a negative growth rate of -28.98%. This was 
attributable to stiff competition from China and industrial offshoring by many of the 
Taiwanese players. In contrast, while the export volume has afterwards remained flat 
or declined a bit recently, its export value has been on a rising trend from US$789 
million in 2004 to US$1,691 million in 2013. As a result, Taiwan’s export per bicycle 
for 2013 totaled US$430, compared to US$157 for 2003 (see Figure 2). Nowadays 
Giant and Merida are top two bicycle manufacturers globally, with well-established 
brands. While Hu and Wu (2008) have given special account to technological 
innovation in explaining Taiwan’s transition to leadership in high-end bicycles, for us 
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the whole picture, centered around A-Team, is much broader and more meaningful 
and is in line with the transition of post catch-up. A-Team was initiated by local firms, 
Giant and Merida, with partial support from the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(MOEA) to upgrade the bicycle industry in Taiwan. Due to A-Team’s persistent effort, 
Taiwan has become a manufacturing base and leading exporter of high-end bicycles, 
through not only industrial upgrading but also stimulating local demands via 
public-private partnership (PPP). 
 
The drastic plummet in Taiwan’s export volume of bicycles (for example -28.98% in 
2000) triggered the transition process. That time was also a turbulent period for the 
bicycle industry in the Western world, where well-established firms, like Specialized 
and Derby either went into bankruptcy or were merged, costing their Taiwanese 
suppliers long-term OEM contracts (Hu and Wu, 2008: 7). Giant and Merida, two 
leading bicycle makers in Taiwan, were reluctant to follow their peers’ step to relocate 
production overseas. Instead, they opted to transform themselves and Taiwan to 
become providers and a lead market of high-end bicycles, where they used to be 
inexperienced. To do so, Giant and Merida worked together with a few component 
suppliers to form A-Team in 2003, based on the model of the Toyota Production 
System (TPS). Its members nowadays are made up of more than 20 major companies 
both at home and abroad (for example, Trek, Specialized, Colnago) in the industry, 
who are not only partners but also competitors. Alongside with Giant and Merida, 
there are also niche high-end bicycle makers in Taiwan, such as Pacific Cycles, 
pioneering and dedicated to compact/folding bikes with own control over the product 
architecture. 
 
In a sense, the transition of the bicycle industry in Taiwan is not as dramatic as 
surging in an emerging industry; instead it comes to resemble exploring a new 
innovation trajectory for the existing Taiwanese players. Given the turbulent situation 
in the Western world in the late 20th century, their chance for imitation was limited, 
while market space for transition beyond catch-up became available. In addition, the 
technology and market over time went through a fluid phase, from urban bicycles, 
mountain bicycles, and more recently to racing bicycles. Bicycles have also been 
shifting from a means of transportation to a sporting, recreational, and fitness products, 
leading bicycles to becoming a “fashionable and creative product”. As a result, high 
value-added bicycles have gone from initially being a niche to a broader market space 





downstream resources to tighten the partnerships among factories, suppliers, and 
distributors. The second stage came with a joint design platform of product data 
management (PDM) set up to develop new products in a collaborative design manner 
and to shorten time to market. At the third stage, A-Team worked more closely with 
independent bicycle dealers rather than warehouse stores to segment A-Team’s 
products from those of warehouse stores. According to Brookfield, Liu and 
MacDuffie (2008), A-Team has created integrated, co-innovative supplier networks 
with two features that differentiate them from traditional modular, symbiotic supplier 
networks. First, whereas traditional supplier systems have emphasized cost control, 
integrated, co-innovative supplier networks appear to focus more on value creation 
through co-innovation. Secondly, by adopting a more integrated network structure, 
such supplier networks appear to have a greater ability to resist imitation. In their 
integrated co-innovative supplier networks, a couple of international leaders of 
bicycle gearshift solutions, Shimano and SRAM have been active partners. It is even 
difficult or not possible for the Taiwanese flagship bicycle makers to keep a distance 
away from Shimano because the latter holds a market dominant position, as Intel in 
the personal computer industry. 
 
What is more, with an aim to cultivate market for premium and trend-setting bicycles, 
A-Team has worked together with the central and local governments and research 
institutes to implement Cycling Island Initiative (see Figure 3). In doing so, Giant 
established the Cycling Life-Style Foundation to promote an island-wide system of 
bike routes. As a result, a new life style of cycling has gained popularity and has been 
highly appreciated by the lay people in the country. The new life style is actually 
being “exported” to China. In fact, according to Giant, all Giant managers throughout 
the world are required to get involved in cycling so that more people can be lured to 
embrace the fun of cycling. To further promote the market, A-Team takes its own 
initiative to organize various events, fan communities and activities to embed cycling 
as part of Taiwan’s socio-economic system by means of product servicizing. In 
particular, by setting up their own travel agencies, major bicycle manufactures have 
actively promoted cycling tourism and the round-Taiwan rides, which have attracted 
many local dwellers as well as foreign visitors. As a result, the enthusiasm for cycling 
in people’s daily life has been widespread in Taiwan.  
 
With bicycles becoming a “fashionable and creative product”, a key issue for the 
flagship firms in the A-Team is how to generate innovative products to drive and meet 
changing market demands. Apart from internal R&D, they have taken advantage of 
International Bicycle Design Competition, organized by a research institute and the 
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high-end market with fuzzy front-end in a way different from their previous paths. 
Organizational innovations within the community of A-Team have turned the loosely 
coupled production networks under a regime of modularity (Hu and Wu, 2008) to 
integrated, co-innovation supplier networks (Brookfield et al., 2008). More 
importantly, while the typical export-oriented model of industrial development in 
Taiwan tended to downplay the role of the domestic demand, A-Team has been 
devoted to the cultivation and promotion of domestic market for premium and 
trend-setting bicycles with series efforts of product servicizing. In this way, a lead 
market has been created out of the local milieu and social settings in Taiwan, which 
has eventually become an essential part of the ecosystem for the transition to 
leadership in Taiwan’s bicycle industry. 
 
4. The Electric Vehicle Industry: A Process of Post Catch-up with Divergent 
Innovations 
Taiwan is by no means a strong player in the mainstream automotive industry. The 
industry in Taiwan has actually been dominated by foreign car makers, especially 
Japanese ones, with strong control over their product architectures and supply chains. 
Not until recent years, has a newly home-grown brand, Luxgen, brought about 
seemingly-promising breakthrough with domestic root. Meanwhile, the 
commercialization of EVs at a pilot but notable scale, which has resulted from the 
marriage of electronics and automotive technologies and that of innovative business 
models and technologies, has brought about a window of opportunity for some of the 
Taiwanese industrial players to penetrate into this emerging sector. Admittedly, it is 
too early to judge their success, but their race to a post catch-up territory shows some 
interesting paths. 
 
In recent years, there has been a strong presumption in favor of bringing EVs to 
market as an important strategy to reduce CO2 emissions. This has come with an 
increasing awareness that to jump start the new market for EVs, innovative business 
models are required, especially those featured by service-orientation (Bohnsack et al., 
2014; Cohen and Naor, 2013; Boons and Ludeke-Freund, 2013; Christensen et al., 
2012). EVs, as a promising alternative to conventional cars, as assumed, are not 
without their own problems, notably limited driving range. EV makers, with a variety 
of policy support, hence have to find a creative way to circumvent the drawbacks of 
EVs (e.g. cost, range, and charging time). The industry is nowadays driven mainly by 
some incumbent car makers and entrepreneurial firms, such as Tesla, in the advanced 
countries. After examining the evolution of business model for EVs, Bohnsack et al. 
(2014) have highlighted the significance of product-service system configurations, 
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especially on the part of the entrepreneurial firms. Generally speaking, many EVs are 
still in the pilot phase and there is much dynamism (Mock and Yang, 2014). Against 
the above backdrop, some Taiwanese industrial players taking advantage of a very 
supportive setting have jumped on the bandwagon, are trying to level the playing field 
in a divergent and distinct manner, as summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1  Diverse Paths of Taiwanese Firms’ Involvement in the Electric Vehicle 
Industry 








• A few Taiwanese players take 
advantage of the rise of Tesla 
as an entrepreneurial EV 
maker and emerging platform 
leader to penetrate into the EV 
ecosystem. 
• A few Taiwanese suppliers 
have become part of Tesla’s 
supplier chain. 
Luxgen • A newly home-grown car 
maker produces own EVs to 
be tested in the government’s 
EV pilot-run project.  
• More than a few hundred EVs 
produced by Luxgen have 
been tested with 
service-oriented business 
models, but no EVs are sold to 
the end customer. 
• The company is also to 
experiment with new 
service-oriented business 
models in additional sites. 
Noveltek • An electric-powered material 
handling equipment maker 
provides total solutions for the 
electrification of 
diesel-powered flat-bed trucks 
(off road) used within a 
large-sized fruit and vegetable 
wholesale market. 
• About 800 diesel-powered 
flat-bed trucks in use are 
scheduled to be electrified 
within two and half a years. 
Teco • An industrial motor maker 
provides motor solutions for 
the electrification of e-trikes 
and e-jeepneys used in the 
Philippines.  
• For two years to come, one 
thousand e-jeepneys annually 
plus complementary solutions 
will be delivered to the 
Philippines. 
Delta  • A power electronics firm 
provides a few different 
solutions for EVs, especially 
charging solutions for EVs.  
• Some of the solutions have 
been installed under pilot run 
projects in Taiwan and 
Thailand. 
• Fast chargers have been sold to 





Among the entrepreneurial firms, Tesla is currently an eye-catching forerunner. Tesla, 
based on electronics technologies and software capabilities, first hit the market with 
its luxury electrical sport car, Roadster. Its following models have been well sold in 
the EV market. Tesla ventured its business, starting as a Silicon Valley-based 
company with few connections with the mainstream car industry. The company came 
to Taiwan to forge a collaboration with a few Taiwanese firms specialized in motor 
and electronics technologies which were willing to co-work with Tesla in a 
customized development and batch-production manner. Notable examples at issue 
include electric motors produced by Fukuta, and battery control units, motor 
controllers and testing equipment from Chroma. While those Taiwanese players are 
still largely unknown in the developed world, they have taken advantage of the rise of 
Tesla as an entrepreneurial EV maker and emerging platform leader (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2002) to penetrate into the EV ecosystem. On the other side of the coin, 
Tesla’s venture into the EV business from scratch had formed a relatively open 
innovation network, different from the typical closed one in the mainstream 
automotive industry, enabling the Taiwanese players eventually to become part of 
Tesla’s supply chain. 
 
There is also an entrepreneurial EV maker in Taiwan. A newly home-grown car maker, 
Luxgen, set a departure from its parent group’s OEM business for foreign car makers 
to promote its own brand. Luxgen developed and produced its own EVs, by taking 
advantage of available foreign solutions, for example, ACP’s powertrain, and by 
leveraging Taiwan’s existing strengths in motor and electronics technologies. Right 
now, Luxgen is the key player in the EV pilot-run project, sponsored by the 
government. Their EV user field trials take place at a few sites in Taiwan, with a 
special focus on service-oriented business models as well as fleet management. For 
the time being, more than a few hundred EVs produced by Luxgen have been tested in 
the field trials, but no EVs are sold to the household. 
 
Of note is an unorthodox approach by some of the Taiwanese players to venture into 
the EV business (see Table 1). For example, Noveltek, an electric-powered material 
handling equipment maker, provides total solutions for the electrification of 
diesel-powered flat-bed trucks (off road) used within a large-sized fruit and vegetable 
wholesale market. Before this electrification project, the diesel-powered flat-bed 
trucks generated serious pollutions and noises, endangering the health of people 
working for the wholesale market. The electrification of those atypical and niche 
vehicles means that “powered by electricity” offers a broader perspective of 
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sustainable and “good-enough innovation” (Chen, Wen and Tsai, 2013; Gadiesh, 
Leung and Vestring, 2007) beyond the typical commercial value creation, set by the 
forerunners. In another example, Teco, an industrial motor maker in Taiwan, has won 
a contract to provide motor solutions for the electrification of e-trikes and e-jeepneys 
used in the Philippines. Jeepneys are the most common form of public transport 
throughout the many islands of the Philippines. In the greater Manila area alone, there 
are estimated to be about three hundred thousand Jeepneys on road. For two years to 
come, Teco is scheduled to deliver one thousand e-jeepneys annually plus 
complementary fleet management solutions to the City of Manila. In a word, what 
Teco intends to explore is a market at the Bottom of the Pyramid (Prahalad, 2005), 
overlooked by the forerunners of EV makers. 
 
With particular regarding to product servicizing, some lessons learned from the EV 
pilot-run projects in Taiwan and elsewhere seem to have gained wide acceptance. On 
the surface, EVs looks like a tempting and promising alternative to conventional 
gasoline-based cars. In fact, the switchover of EVs in the global market as well as 
Taiwan is much longer than expected. It is well-noted that EVs’ limited driving range 
gives rise to “range anxiety”. There are other downsides of EVs that may bring about 
what may be termed “ownership anxiety” because of factors such as uncertainty about 
battery lifetime, the end-of-life value and safety of EVs. The ownership anxiety may 
not be solved simply by widespread rollout of charging station networks for EVs. A 
question to be addressed then concerns whether or not EVs nowadays can 
straightforwardly rival conventional cars. Is it comfortable for a critical mass of end 
customers to actually own an EV without hesitation? In other words, there is market 
uncertainty and equivocality in bringing EVs to the market, which may need to be 
partially circumvented or mitigated by the experimentation of different 
service-oriented business models. Better Place’s battery swapping model once looked 
promising (Christensen et al., 2012), but the company eventually went bankrupt, even 
with active supports from a few national governments. In our opinion, the fall of 
Better Place had much to do with the fact that Better Place ran into conflict with car 
makers over the control of product architecture of vehicles and ran the risk of bearing 
huge investment and depreciation costs of the batteries. 
 
Given the fact that no EVs produced by Luxgen are sold to the end customer, there is 
a shift in field experimentation in the Taiwanese pilot-run projects towards some other 
specific service-oriented business models. For example, the e-mobility car-sharing 
model, demonstrated at a large-scale field trial in Paris by Autolib (Weiller, 2012), has 
come to focal attention. With a business model of the servitization of mobility in 
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urban areas, Autolib has by far formed the largest EV fleet in the world. With the 
service system, EVs are available for short-term leasing in the greater Paris area to 
any member of the public with a subscription. As of the end of 2013, about 110.000 
subscribers had had access to 2,000 EVs at 850 stations. This model coincides with 
our advocating view in Taiwan that the initial introduction of EVs to the marketplace 
had better take place at somewhere within manageable limited ranges and 
environment. In fact, among the pilot-run projects sponsored by the Taiwanese 
government, Toyota’s car-sharing model in the Sun Moon Lake, a famous tourism 
hotspot with a relatively closed environment has gained much more acceptance than 
the other projects. We therefore tend to suggest that EVs are nowadays better 
positioned as a complementary mobility services to the existing transportation system 
than a direct rival to conventional cars. Still EVs makers, both the incumbent and 
entrepreneurial ones, intermediaries, such as Better Place and Autolib, and alike have 
to stand up to the challenge of how to cultivate the market with appropriate 
service-oriented business models. From the perspective of product servicizing, they 
need to integrate the product functionality with appropriate mobility services by 
mobilizing and integrating complementary assets to prevail in the industry. 
 
Most of the Taiwanese players did not come from nowhere. For example, Delta has 
long been a well-established electronics and power system company in Taiwan with 
global outreach. Apart from its charging solutions for EVs, the firm has even 
demonstrated its comprehensive EV solutions for turning an existing model of 
BMW’s into an EV version. Another firm, Teco, based on its existing capabilities in 
power systems, has become an electrification solution provider for well-adopted niche 
vehicles in a less advanced market. Their strategic intent seems to aim for a position 
of tier 1 or tier 2 suppliers-to-be in the emerging EV industry. In other words, the 
development of EVs enables some domain knowledge outside the mainstream 
automotive industry to be incorporated into the industrial ecosystem. For those 
working with Tesla, they had to transform their existing capabilities and products by 
co-working and co-developing with Tesla in the fluid phase.  
 
In summary, for the first time in history, EVs have researched an industrial level of 
development. In this transition period, a few Taiwanese players are in the middle of 
levelling the playing field with the forerunners in the advanced countries. Since, 
Taiwan lacks a strong base and track records in the mainstream automotive industry, 
with a strongly supportive setting in Taiwan, their paths towards post-catch-up 
collectively tend to take an approach similar to the entrepreneurial firms. There are 
however some distinct elements in their diverse paths, including co-innovation with 
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an emerging platform leader and the exploration of an underserved market. Above all, 
it has become an established trend that firms in the EV industry have to pay attention 
to the specific need in the application context, shifting their focus from sale of product 
to a service-oriented business model. From the perspective of product servicizing, the 
key stakeholders to cultivate the market need to integrate the EV product functionality 
with appropriate mobility services by mobilizing and integrating complementary 
assets to prevail in the industry. 
 
5. Discussions 
For our following discussions, Table 2 presents comparisons of the two cases with a 
few dimensions: developmental stage of the sector, strategic intent of the key players, 
key issues at the fuzzy front-end, key actions taken, and performance achieved. Based 
on these comparisons, we would like to discuss a few issues in conjunction with post 
catch-up. 
 
Developmental stage and post catch-up: The literature on technological catch-up has 
paid particular attention to such an issue as how latecomers to climb the technological 
ladder and eventually overtake the forerunner by approaching the technological 
frontier (Lee and Kim, 2001; Lee et al., 2005; Hobday et al., 2004). Following this, 
catch-up, leapfrogging, and/or post-catch-up often occur in a phased manner, referring 
particularly to different stages in the product life cycle (Lee, 2005). If one takes a 
broader perspective of innovation, post catch-up and leapfrogging can take different 
forms from the archetype discussed in the literature. In case of the bicycle industry, 
post catch-up became an issue for the Taiwanese players to address. This transition 
was facilitated by the process of transforming their products from middle-end to 
high-end, and from urban bicycles, mountain bicycles, to racing bicycles. This came 
along with a new “S Curve” or innovation trajectory surging or created in the existing 
product life cycle (Kash and Rycroft, 2002). In the EV case, a window of opportunity 
became available, when EVs entered the industrial level of development. The 
Taiwanese players are trying to seize this opportunity to level the playing field with 
the forerunners. In doing so, they either co-evolve with the emerging platform leader 
or explore an underserved niche in a less advanced market. Admittedly, their 
technological capabilities may not be as superior as the existing leaders, but the 
development of EVs enables some domain knowledge outside the mainstream 
automotive industry to be incorporated into the industrial ecosystem. What they are 
trying to achieve is find a way or forge good-enough innovations (Christensen, 2003; 
Chen et al., 2013c) to hold a favorable position within the ecosystem-to-form when 
the market and industry are still at a fluid phase. An implication of above discussions 
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is that technological catch-up is not necessarily a prelude to post catch-up, depending 
on the nature of new innovation trajectory and entry modes of the emerging industry.  
 
Table 2  Comparisons of the Two Cases 
Dimension The Bicycle Industry The EV Industry 
Developmental 
stage of the 
sector 
• A well-established industry in 
Taiwan engages in a transition to 
leadership, when facing stiff 
competition from other 
latecomers. 
• EVs reached the industrial 
level of development in the 
automotive industry, giving 
rise to leapfrogging for new 
entrants and entrepreneurial 
firms, apart from the 
incumbents. 
Strategic intent 
of the key 
players 
• The key players aim to transform 
themselves and the local setting 
in Taiwan to become a leader in 
high-end bicycles.  
• With no strong base in the 
mainstream automotive 
industry in Taiwan, a few 
domestic industrial players 
aim to explore the 
possibility of levelling the 
playing field with the 
forerunners in the advanced 
countries.  
Key issues at 
the fuzzy 
front-end 
• How to cope with product 
transition, from middle-end to 
high-end, and from urban 
bicycles, mountain bicycles, to 
racing bicycles? 
• How to cultivate a lead market in 
Taiwan, making high-end 
bicycles from a niche market to a 
much broader market space? 
• How to get involved in the 
emerging innovation 
networks? 
• How to deal with the 
fuzziness of market for EVs 




• With organizational innovations, 
to turn the loosely coupled 
product networks to integrated, 
co-innovation supplier networks 
• Via PPP, to cultivate and promote 
the domestic market for premium 
and trend-setting bicycles with 
series efforts of product 
servicizing 
• In a setting of strong policy 
support, to explore and 
refine meaningful and 
valuable business models, 
with service-orientation 
• To explore an underserved 
niche in a less advanced 
market 
• Co-innovation with an 
emerging platform leader 
Performance 
achieved 
• Taiwan has become a lead market 
for high-end bicycles with 
experience economy. 
• The flagship firms have become 
global leaders with 
well-established brands. 
• Despite of some progress 
made, the industry and 
market are still in the pilot 
stage with dynamism; hence 
the Taiwanese players’ 




Path dependence and post catch-up: The Taiwanese cases suggest the way in which a 
latecomer’s industry to rise in a post-catch-up manner has something to do with path 
dependence. Taiwan’s structural weaknesses in the automotive industry, for example 
being short of well-established car makers and the ability to control the product 
architecture do form constraints on the players’ innovation paths towards the 
emerging industries. Apart from Luxgen, other players with capabilities in module or 
component technologies have to find other ways to enter into the industry than being a 
genuine EV maker. On the other hand, the flagship firms in the bicycle industry have 
managed to overcome problems associated with path dependence. It is worthwhile to 
note the discussions in Taiwan about branding versus ODM, in terms of industrial 
upgrading. Referring to the ICT industry, Chu (2009) threw out the issue: “can 
Taiwan’s second movers upgrading via branding (in a natural way)?” In the end, she 
reached the conclusion: “the evolution of the (ODM) firms’ organizational capabilities 
led to path dependence in further development. As the second mover builds up 
organizational capabilities as a subcontractor, these capabilities become the guiding 
and limiting factors influencing the firm’s strategic choices in further expansion 
(p.1064).” Obviously, the Taiwanese case of the bicycle industry has proven 
something can be done to overcome these capabilities gap. Their recipe for both 
upgrading with branding and post catch-up arguably are linked to multi-faceted 
transformation under the umbrella of A-Team, which has involved a process of 
reinvention, requiring across-the-board changes including goal-setting, new product 
and service development, and a massive cultural change and organizational 
restructuring (Brookfield et al., 2008; Chen, Wen, Liu and Lin, 2006). 
 
Service-oriented business model, market cultivation and post catch-up: It has been 
well-accepted that innovative business models are not only essential to an innovator’s 
value creation and value capture but also indispensable to the birth of an emerging 
industry (Teece, 2010; Kley et al., 2011; Lenfle and Midler, 2009). While the 
literature on technological catch-up has noted the risk of initial market creation (Lee, 
2005), delicate considerations of the role of business models in catch-up and post 
catch-up in an emerging industry and industrial transformation are still needed. This 
requires a holistic view of the non-technological and market cultivation aspects of the 
sector involved (Chen et al., 2014). To compete and prevail in a post catch-up manner, 
as discussed above, there is indeed market uncertainty and equivocality in bringing 
EVs to the market, which may need to be partially circumvented or mitigated by the 
experimentation of different service-oriented business models. EV pilot-run projects 
orchestrated in Taiwan and elsewhere have set up a playing field for various key 
players of EVs to cultivate and interact with the market.  
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In addition, referring to Chesbrough and Teece’s (1996) dichotomy of systemic 
innovations versus autonomous innovations, we tend to think that it is more 
meaningful to discuss post catch-up in conjunction with systemic innovations because 
this type of innovation presents more challenges of fuzzy front-end. Spohrer and 
Maglio (2008) have suggested that one challenge to this type of service innovations is 
“the interdisciplinary nature of service, integrating technology, business, social and 
client (demand) innovations”. In fact, the resurgence of the bicycle industry in Taiwan 
involves not just product innovations but cultivating a lead market in Taiwan by 
shaping the local milieu and social settings to form influential innovative solutions 
with elements of experience economy.  
 
Our Taiwanese cases go further to suggest the importance of product servicizing as a 
means of post catch-up. As noted earlier, there are two facets of the servitization of 
manufacturing and/or product servicizing: corporate strategy of transformation for 
individual manufacturers and the nature and way of manufacturing development for a 
few emerging sectors. A few studies (Bohnsack et al., 2014; Kley et al., 2011) have 
indeed highlighted the significance of product-service system configurations in the 
emerging business model for EVs, especially for entrepreneurial car makers. Likewise, 
the market cultivation of the pilot-run projects in Taiwan takes the same flavor. 
A-Team in the bicycle industry has also been devoted to the cultivation and promotion 
of domestic market for premium and trend-setting bicycles with series efforts at 
product servicizing. Even complex systems, in which the literature on technological 
catch-up is particularly interested in (Choung and Hwang, 2007; Mu and Lee, 2005), 
intrinsically involve a great deal of system integration of both upstream and 
downstream business offerings, bearing a resemblance to servicizing and the 
servitization of manufacturing (Chen et al., 2013a). 
 
Market segments and post catch-up: A sharp distinction between the two cases 
concerns their target market segments. On the one hand, A-Team in the bicycle 
industry focuses mainly on a high-end market segment, with series efforts to 
transform it from initially being a niche to a broader market space featured by wide 
choice with short lifecycle and a number of varieties. On the other hand, a few players, 
such as Teco and Noveltek in the Taiwanese EV industry opt to explore a market 
segment with good-enough innovation, underserved and overlooked by the 
forerunners of EV makers. In fact, good-enough innovation has been particularly 
linked to such latecomers as China and India. Existing evidence suggests that China’s 
severe uneven development in both spatial and social terms can be leveraged to 
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generate the Bottom of the Pyramid Innovation (Prahalad, 2005) and/or good-enough 
innovation (Gadiesh et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2013c) that may be able to challenge the 
status quo in the industry (Christensen, 2003). In a same vein, a few of the Taiwanese 
EV players are trying to offer good-enough electrification solutions to a niche market 
at home and in a less advanced market in the Philippines. Moreover, referring to our 
view that EVs are nowadays better positioned as a complementary mobility services 
to the existing transportation system than a direct rival to conventional cars, 
good-enough innovations may arguably be a feasible path for the industrial take-off 
and commercial deployment of EVs. 
 
Platforms, national boundaries and post catch-up: In reviewing the literature in 
Section 2, we threw out a question concerning the extent to which the new innovation 
system required for post catch-up (Choung and Hwang, 2014) is confined by the 
national boundary, especially when one takes into account the effect of lock-in and 
path-dependence. Our cases tend to suggest that post catch-up by a latecomer had 
better go beyond a self-sufficient view, especially when one takes into account the 
pattern of inter-organizational platform-based development in a cross-border manner 
(Chen et al, 2013b). In fact, even the rise of Tesla as a leading EV entrepreneurial firm, 
has benefitted a lot from its links to Taiwan’s domain in component technologies at 
the development and production stages. From the Taiwanese perspective, this means 
co-innovation with an emerging platform leader (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). Not to 
mention, systemic service innovations often involve multi-stakeholders, playing 
different roles (Chen et al., 2014). 
 
Regarding the market side, while A-Team has been devoted to the cultivation and 
promotion of the domestic market for trend-setting bicycles with series efforts of 
product servicizing, they still depend on the gearshift solutions provided by foreign 
leading players, such as Shimano and SRAM. International Bicycle Design 
Competition also provides a platform for A-Team to capitalize on innovative design 
ideas from abroad as well as Taiwan. In the EV industry, to explore good-enough 
innovations in a less developed market, market cultivation and interactions in the host 
country are an essential part of the innovation system for the Taiwanese EV player. By 
implication, for post catch-up at an industrial level, a latecomer’s innovation system 
and its boundaries have to be shaped in line with the country’s level of technological 
accumulation, constituent firm’s strategy, the complexity of the innovation at issue, 





As a few fast followers or latecomers have caught up with the advanced countries in 
one industry or another, an issue worthy of scrutiny concerns how they are to engage 
with the existing forerunners in an emerging industry or in the following industrial 
migration. This issue has been addressed mostly by the literature on technological 
catch-up with special focus on leapfrogging or competing for the technological 
frontier. As a result, technology creation has been spotlighted as a dominant factor for 
this transition. There is also implicit presumption that technological catch-up is a 
prelude to leapfrogging. 
 
Choung and his colleagues (Choung et al., 2014; Hwang and Choung, 2013) initiated 
the discussion on post catch-up with a broader perspective of innovation than just 
technology. For us one challenge to post catch-up is related to the situation where the 
innovation model and path are at the fluid phase and where scarce opportunity for 
imitation is present. This has led us to giving special attention to fuzzy front-end at 
the industrial level and how market cultivation and innovative business models come 
to play an important role in shaping the innovation path for post catch-up.  
 
With industrial case studies, the paper has discussed a new pattern of industrial 
development in the Taiwan’s transportation equipment industries, which seems to 
demonstrate a strong flavor of post catch-up. The bicycle and EV industries differ in 
their developmental status and stage, facing different developmental issues. For a 
couple of leading players in Taiwan’s bicycle industry, a key issue they faced at the 
turn of this century was how to transform themselves and the local setting in Taiwan 
to become a leader in high-end bicycles, in an attempt to fend off escalated 
international competition. To deal with this, they took initiative to form a consortium, 
called A-Team, to upgrade the bicycle industry in Taiwan. Due to A-Team’s persistent 
effort, Taiwan has nowadays become a the leading exporter and a lead market of 
high-end bicycles, through not only industrial upgrading but also stimulating local 
demands via public-private partnership. In the emerging EV industry, the Taiwanese 
players have been trying to overcome its structural weaknesses in the mainstream 
automotive industry to explore the possibility of levelling the playing field with the 
forerunners in the advanced countries. Since, Taiwan lacks a strong base and track 
records in the mainstream automotive industry, with a strongly supportive setting in 
Taiwan, their paths towards post-catch-up collectively tend to take an approach 
similar to the entrepreneurial firms. There are however some distinct elements in their 
diverse paths, including co-innovation with an emerging platform leader and the 
exploration of an underserved market. Above all, it has become an established trend 
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that firms in the EV industry have to pay attention to the specific need in the 
application context, shifting their focus from sale of product to a service-oriented 
business model. From the perspective of product servicizing, the key stakeholders to 
cultivate the market need to integrate the EV product functionality with appropriate 
mobility services by mobilizing and integrating complementary assets to prevail in the 
industry. 
 
The analyses of our industrial cases go further to suggest that technological catch-up 
is not necessarily a prelude to post catch-up, depending on the nature of new 
innovation trajectory and entry modes of the emerging industry. While the way in 
which a latecomer’s industry to rise in a post-catch-up manner has something to do 
with path dependence, something can be done to overcome the path dependence. Our 
analyses also lend support to the importance of product servicizing as a means of post 
catch-up, especially from the perspective of market cultivation. On balance, for post 
catch-up at an industrial level, a latecomer’s innovation system and its boundaries 
have to be shaped in line with the country’s level of technological accumulation, 
constituent firm’s strategy, the complexity of the innovation at issue, and the way in 
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